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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the Rwandan experience of Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) from 1997 to 2008, with a 
view to x-raying the nature, pattern, principles, and legacies of DDR 
in that context, in addition to setting agenda for the practice of DDR 
elsewhere in Africa. By way of a desk exegesis, the paper posits that 
DDR was significantly successful given the fact that it led to 
successful demobilisation and reintegration of a large number of ex-
combatants who participated in the Rwanda crisis. The paper notes, 
however that the Rwanda DDR failed to a large extent in disarming 
and demobilizing many of the ex-armed groups operating in the 
country and its proximate region. In the light of the limited success 
of the Rwandan DDR efforts, it is therefore recommended that future 
DDR programmes in Africa should be holistic and pragmatic enough 
to address the concerns of DDR within the formal military sector as 
well as frontiers of militia formations. This entails considering DDR 
not merely as a Security Sector Reform (SSR), but essentially, an 
effort at state building in conflict and post-conflict situations. 
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1. Introduction 
State-building in post conflict situations is an onerous process that involves mitigation of multiple 
development and security challenges. The challenges include the task of reconstruction, rehabilitation, 
reconciliation and peace-building. A crucial aspect of this process is the imperative of demilitarizing the civil 
population in an attempt to ensure sustainable peace and stability (Takeuchi, 2011).  
Demilitarizing the civil population in the aftermath of a violent conflict is a strategic process involving a 
conscious effort to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the combatant elements of the society into the 
mainstream of civilian life. The essence of the process is to pragmatically dismantle the existing abusive 
military structures with a view to forestall the possibility of violent backlashes or a recrudescence of military 
violence (Okoli, 2015). The need to achieve a sustainable peace-building in post conflict states have led to the 
institutionalization of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) as a veritable state-building 
and security sector reform strategy.  
According to Social Development Department (2009) DDR refers to “a process that contributes to 
security and stability by disarming combatants, removing them from military structures, and socially and 
economically integrating them into society”. Over the years, various patterns of DDR programme have been 
implemented across the world, with Africa taking the lion‟s share (Carames & Sanz, 2009); see also Table 6 -- 
the appendix). In Africa, DDR has been implemented in Rwanda, Congo DR, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Angola, 
Nigeria (Niger-Delta), Sudan, Cote d‟Ivoire and Burundi, with varying degrees of success (Banholzer, 2004). 
This paper is concerned with the review of DDR in Rwanda with the intent to underscoring its legacies and 
constraints, as well as pointing out possible lessons for the practice in Africa. The remainder of the paper is 
structured along the following themes: overview of the Rwandan crisis; the Rwandan DDR experience; 
peculiarities and legacies of the Rwandan model of DDR; conclusion and recommendation. 
 
2. Conceptualizing and Operationalizing DDR 
The acronym „DDR‟ stands for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. It is an aspect of the 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict states geared towards de-militarization of society in pursuit of 
sustainable peace and stability (Molloy, 2015). 
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2.1. Meaning of DDR 
DDR refers to the process of demilitarizing official and unofficial armed groups by controlling and 
reducing the possession and use of arms, by disbanding non-state armed groups and right-sizing state security 
services and by assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life (Ball & Goor, 2006). More lucidly, 
(Carames & Sanz, 2009) define DDR as: 
a process that targets a determinate number of combatants, whether as individuals or groups, belonging 
to the Armed Forces or armed opposition groups, in order to disarm, demilitarize and reintegrate these 
persons into civilian life, the Armed Forces or the Police. 
It follows from the foregoing definitions that DDR is a wartime or post-conflict phenomenon that can 
target both state and non-state military actors (ex-combatants), with a view of either reintegrating them into 
regular state military services, or demilitarizing and re-civilianizing them for onward reintegration into the 
civil society. 
 
2.2. Components of DDR 
DDR can be viewed as a five-stage process that involves weapons surrender, assembly (collection), 
discharge, short-to-medium reinsertion, and longer term reintegration (Ball & Goor, 2006). The main 
components of the process include disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. The 
aforementioned aspects of DDR have been operationally defined by the (United Nations Office on Drugs 
Crime, 2005) as contained in Table 1. 
 
Table-1. Operational Definitions of Components of DDR. 
Component Definition 
Disarmament Collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and 
light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population; 
development of responsible arms management programmes. 
Demobilization Formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from Armed Forces or other armed 
groups; processing of individual combatants in temporary centers, massing of troops in 
designated camps for the purposes of the above 
Reinsertion Short term transnational assistance given to ex-combatants in the form of material and/or 
financial offering(s) to meet their personal and family needs in the interim. 
Reintegration Process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment 
and income; it is a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking 
place in communities at the local level as part of the general national development drive in 
the post-conflict era. 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs Crime (2005). 
 
Table-2. Patterns of DDR based on Country-specific Contexts. 
Country Pattern 
Afghanistan Unilateral disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration of Armed Forces in wartime 
Angola Bilateral demobilisation of Armed Forces and armed opposition groups for security sector reform in post-
war conflicts 
Burundi Multilateral DDR with restructuring to the Armed Forces in a post-war context 
Chad Bilateral demobilisation of militias and Armed Forces containing child soldiers in a context of regional 
insecurity 
Colombia Unilateral demobilization of paramilitaries in a war context 
Cote D‟Ivoire Bilateral demobilisation of Armed Forces and armed opposition groups and security sector reform in a 
post-cold war context. 
Central African 
Republic 
Bilateral demobilisation of armed opposition groups in post-war conflict 
DR Congo Bilateral demobilisation of militias for security sector reform in post war context 
Eritrea Mass demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of Armed Forces and security sector reform in a post 
war context. 
Indonesia Disarmament and reintegration of the Free Aceh Movement armed opposition group and redeployment of 
state security forces in Aceh.  
Liberia Multilateral and mass disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of a wide variety of 
combatant groups, with special attention paid to child soldiers and a redistribution of political power. 
Nepal Cantonment and Identification of the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) with a process of discussion for 
military and civilian reintegration in a context of political transition. 
Rwanda Demobilization of armed opposition groups with security sector reforms 
Sudan Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration occurring jointly with integration of armed groups and 
the building of the Armed Forces. 
Uganda Disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion programming targeting a variety of armed opposition 
groups containing large numbers of women and child soldiers. 
Nigeria Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militants in a context of counter-insurgency 
programme. 
Source: Adapted from Carames and Sanz (2009). 
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2.3. Patterns of DDR 
Based in the peculiarity of the principles and practices of DDR in different states over the years, a number 
of patterns of DDR can be identifies. Table 2 gives valuable insights in that regard. 
 
2.4. Target Groups/Beneficiaries of DDR 
The primary target groups of DDR are state and non-state ex-combatants. However, dependants of these 
ex-combatants as well as the communities where they resettle may benefit from DDR programmes. Table 3 
puts the above notion into proper perspective. 
 
Table-3. Target Groups/ Beneficiaries of DDR. 
Targets/Beneficiaries Remark(s) 
Combatants Males and females who have participated in combat; support agents to the 
combats such as cooks, porters, messengers, sex slaves, abductees. 
Dependants The spouses, children and other dependants of the combatants 
Communities The communities where ex-combatants resettle may benefit from DDR 
programme, especially when they are delivered through community-based 
mechanisms, 
Source: Social Development Department (2009). 
 
2.5. Principles of DDR 
The two cardinal principles of DDR are amnesty and civil acceptance. Amnesty presupposes that there 
should be total state pardon for those who have volunteered to disarm and demobilize. There should be a firm 
assurance for the ex-combatants that they will be re-integrated, not punished (Waldorf, 2009). In other words, 
the processes and outcome of DDR should be credible and gracious enough to foreclose all possibilities of 
future criminal prosecution and victimization. The principle of civil acceptance entails that the ex-combatants 
and their support agents must be freely and unconditionally accepted by the civil society or regular military 
structures. They should be rest assured of public empathy and trust in the course of their reintegration 
processes. Most importantly, there should be a sense of assurance that the candidates are not stigmatized. 
These principles are fundamental to the success of the DDR programme. 
 
2.6. Significance of DDR 
DDR is strategic to effective resolution of violent conflict. It is also indispensable to sustainable peace-
building in post-conflict war scenarios. According to Ball and van de Goor:  
The process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants 
plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. DDR processes have become an integral 
part of peacekeeping operations and post conflict reconstruction activities. Their success or 
failure can affect long tern peace building prospects for any post-conflict society (2006: iv). 
To what extent is the aforementioned assertion true of Rwanda? This question forms the main concern of 
the subsequent sections of this paper. But before we delve into this concern, an overview of the Rwandan 
crisis/ conflict is germane so as to properly situate the discourse. 
 
3. Overview of the Rwandan Crisis 
The Rwandan crisis stated in 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi-dominated exiled 
rebel movement based in Uganda invaded Rwanda. This dramatic invasion triggered a wave of violence that 
culminated in a civil war that lasted for four years. The RPF demanded the right to return for all Tutsi 
refugees as well as political power sharing with the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Government led by Juvenal 
Habyarimana. Habyarimana‟s government was authoritarian and unpopular. The government came under a 
sapping pressure from the international community and domestic opponents to democratise. In response to the 
rising pro-democracy pressures, the government got reactionary, militarized the Rwandan society, and 
brutalized the Tutsi civilians (Waldorf, 2009). 
The 1992 ceasefire agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government failed in early 1993, 
leading to an upsurge of violence in some parts of Rwanda. Peace talk resumed in the second quarter of 1993, 
culminating in the Arusha Accords that created a broad-based government that retained Habyarimana in 
power after a strategic power sharing deal between the government and the oppositions. As part of the peace 
deal, the RPF was to be integrated into the new national army. Amidst palpable fears of retrenchment, 
numerous Rwandan army officers and soldiers opposed the peace agreement (Waldorf, 2009). 
On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana‟s plane was shot down by unknown assailants, resulting in his death. This 
incident informed a tumultuous uprising wherein Hutu extremists seized control of the state and orchestrated 
massive extermination campaign against the Tutsi. The outcome of this orgy of violence was the notorious 
Rwandan genocide that led to the death of half a million Tutsi (Pottier, 2002). The genocide ended in 1994 
with the military triumph of the RPF and the exile of the Hutu-dominated genocidal forces to Zaire (now DR 
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Congo). The forces remobilized at the refugee camps in Zaire and, with the backing of the Mobutu Sese Seko‟s 
regime, launched counter-attacks on Rwanda. 
Following complaints of political victimization by the Congolese Tutsi, Rwanda led an irredentist attack 
on Zaire (now DR Congo) in 1996, in coalition with Uganda, Angola and Laurent Desire Kabila‟s Alliance of 
Democratic forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). This incident led to the toppling of Mobutu in 
May 1997 and the installing of Kabila as president (Pottier, 2002). Sequel to the backlash of anti-Tutsi 
disposition by Kabila‟s government in 1998, Rwanda instigated an anti-Kabila rebellion led by the Congolese 
Rally for Democracy (RCD). Then again, Rwanda invaded Congo alongside Uganda and Burundi. 
In 1999, Rwanda became engrossed in a battle for the control of natural resources in Kisangani and 
eastern Congo areas. In this regard, it participated in arming, financing and mentoring ethnic militias in the 
region for the purposes of seizing territory and extracting natural resources (Waldorf, 2009). In the process, it 
fell out with its erstwhile strategic ally, Uganda. The crisis was addressed by the Lusaka agreement wherein 
parties agreed to disarm the relevant militias and turn over suspected genocide‟s culprit to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
Following the assassination of President Kabila in January 2001, Joseph Kabila, his son assumed the 
presidency. Joseph Kabila exhibited more commitment to the Lusaka agreement and demonstrated favourable 
disposition to future peace deals. The protracted dialogue hosted by South Africa in 2002 materialized in the 
resolution by Rwanda and the Kinshasha government to cease hostilities. Consequently, the Rwanda troops 
pulled out of eastern Congo by October 2002, paving the way for all stakeholder agreement that installed a 
transitional government in July, 2003. The transition ended in November 2006 with a national election that 
returned Kabila as president. Since then, Rwanda has been under uneasy stability with reduced military 
disturbances. 
 
4. The Rwandan DDR Experience 
DDR in Rwanda had obtained in two dispensations: 1997-2001 and 2001-2008. The first phase (1997-
2001) was focused in the military sector while the second phase (2001-2008) included the ex-armed groups. 
The Rwandan DDR was anchored by the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) 
whose targets included to: 
i. Demobilise and reintegrate 22000 members of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and 12500 
members if the whom 11250 were adults and 1250 are child soldiers from armed groups (AG); 
ii. Support reinsertion and reintegration of 13000 settled ex-forces Armies Rwanduises (ex-FAR); 
iii. Support the socio-economic reintegration of all stage II ex-combatants  and vulnerable ex-
combatants of stage I who remain socio-economically vulnerable; 
iv. Facilitate re-allocation of government expenditure from defence to social and economic sectors; and 
v. Support the reinsertion of 5600 dependants of members of the ex-armed groups (Rwanda, 2002). 
Although RDRC was formed in 1997 as an autonomous government commission, it was not formally 
and statutorily established until 2002. Box 1 highlights some vital information on the RDRD. 
 
Box-1. The Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC): Quick Review. 
The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), was formed in January 1997 as an 
autonomous government commission, and was formally established in the year 2002 by a presidential 
decree no 37/01 of 09/04/2002. 
It is charged with planning and implementing the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration 
programme for ex-combatants. The commission is composed of 5 commissioners including the Chairman. 
A Technical Secretariat (TS), headed by a Programme Coordinator, assist the Commission to implement 
the programme and has five departments namely: Operations, Finance, Human Resources and 
Administration, Procurement and Monitoring and Evaluation. 
Under the Operation department are 5 Provincial Reintegration Officers (RROS) which support the 
reinsertion and reintegration activities of the programme in 30 districts. 
  Source: www.mifotra.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/chaters?RDRC_PDF (accessed 4/4/2016). 
 
Operationally, DDR work in Rwanda focused on a number of aspirations: 
i. Demobilising approximately 36,000 ex-combatants, 20,000 from the old Armed Forces and 16000 
from armed groups with support for reintegration into civilian life; 
ii. Reinserting ex-FAR members and reducing government military spending by redirecting funds to 
social and economic projects; 
iii. Reintegrating ex-combatants demobilised in a previous phase into social and economic life, in 
compliance with Arusha agreement; 
iv. Providing consistent support for ex-combatants assisting communities with reintegration and 
promoting confidence measures in government; 
v. Ensuring social security and pensions for ex-combatants are given for RDRD assistance (Carames & 
Sanz, 2009) 
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The Rwandan DDR was based on the principle of self-persuasion: Target groups were entreated and 
persuaded to identify with the process without any resort to state coercion. However, ensure that the 
participants were really from the rank and file of the ex-combatants, certain eligibility criteria were set inter 
alia: 
i. The participant/candidate must be of Rwandan nationality; 
ii. He/she must prove his status as a combatant; 
iii. He/she must prove his affiliation to an armed group; 
iv. He/she must show military experience combating with the APR in the DR Congo or Rwanda or; 
v. He/she must demonstrate military ability (e.g capacity to use a gun) (Carames & Sanz, 2009). 
The Rwandan DDR was funded by a multilateral arrangement involving the Rwandan government and 
other international platforms. Table 4 provide useful data in this regard. 
 
Table-4. Funders of the Rwandan DDR. 
Donor/Funder Million USD % 
World Bank 32.7 48.3 
MDTF 14.4 21.3 
United Kingdom, DFID 8.8 13.1 
Germany, GTZ 8.6 12.7 
Government of Rwanda 2.7 4.0 
African Union 0.3 0.4 
Total 67.6 100 
               Source: MDRP, Rwandan Fact sheet, cited in (Carames & Sanz, 2009). 
 
Data reflected in Table 4 above point to the fact that the Rwandan DDR was well funded by way of a 
multilateral intervention. The table also indicate that the Rwandan Government contributed a paltry 
percentage of the funds (2.7%). It is to be noted that the information (facts and figures) contained in Table 4 
refer to the second phase of DDR implementation in Rwanda (2001-2004). Whereas the Rwandan 
Government only played a complementary role in generating the baseline funds in this dispensation, it 
principally bore the funding requirements in the first phase (1997-2001). 
The first phase of DDR in Rwanda started in 1997 and ended in 2001. In this dispensation, a total of 
18,692 RPA soldiers were demobilised while 15,000 ex-FAR soldiers were reintegrated into RPA (Takeuchi, 
2011). This period of DDR implementation in Rwanda was characterized by a number of factors. First, it was 
military sector-oriented, principally targeting ex-combatants within the sector. Secondly, DDR in this 
dispensation was marked by limited success arising from budgetary shortfalls. Thirdly, the DDR package was 
not comprehensive enough to cater for the armed groups and the female soldiers (Waldorf, 2009). The 
involvement of the Rwandan government in the crisis situation occasioned general donor reluctance towards 
the Rwandan DDR efforts. Thus, amidst operational limitations arising from funding and logistics, Rwandan 
DDR endeavours in the first phase became ineffective and challenged. The second phase of DDR in Rwanda 
(2001-2008) was well programmed and funded. It was also comprehensive in focus, targeting female soldiers, 
child soldiers, ex-combatants‟ dependants and armed groups (Waldorf, 2009). It marked a clear departure from 
the first phase by emphasizing the demobilization of the various armed groups that participated in the 
Rwandan crisis. Demobilization of RDF soldiers started in April 2002 and terminated in 2006. The formal 
yardsticks for demobilizing the RDF soldiers included illness, disability and age. Demobilising RDF soldiers 
received a parting allowance that amounted to thirty percent of his last monthly pay (Waldorf, 2009). 
Ex-combatants from armed groups were disarmed in the DRC by the MONUC before their return to 
Rwanda. To be eligible for demobilization the ex-combatants had to prove that they returned to Rwanda after 
May 2001; could handle an assault rifle; and belonged to a certain military command structure (Waldorf, 
2009). The ex-combatants participating in the DAR programme in phase II were gathered in „solidarity camps‟ 
(ingando) where they were exposed to civic trainings covering aspects of the Rwandan culture, history and 
heritage, public health, micro-financing, national unity and conciliation, etc. The demobilisation programme 
was significantly successful, although there was a low rate of demobilisation by ex-armed groups who were 
still engaged in fighting in the region (Takeuchi, 2011). Table 5 provides useful insights in this regard. 
 
 
Table-5. Demobilisation in Rwanda (2001-2006): Objectives and Reductions attained. 
Category Number of ex-combatants Percentage 
 Objective Attained % 
Ex-RDF (Adults) 20,000 20,039 100% 
Ex-FAR (Adults) 13,000 12,969 100% 
Ex-Armed Groups (Adults) 14,400 6,005 42% 
Ex-Armed Groups (Children) 1,600 644 40% 
Total 49,000 39,657  
      Source: Takeuchi (2011). 
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In terms of reintegration, DDR in Rwanda was also fairly successful. Participants were given both 
insertion and reintegration supports. The vulnerable ex-combatants were given some social security grants 
while ex-combatants were encouraged to form associations for micro-financing. The success narrative of the 
re-integration has been aptly captured thus. All ex-combatants receive reinsertion support (Basic Needs Kit) 
when they graduate from ingando (solidarity camp). Reinsertion support consists of approximately US$100 
and basic household supplies. As of May 2007, 38,846 ex-combatants (including 260 women) had benefited 
from reinsertion support. 47 All ex-combatants also receive reintegration support consisting of between 
US$150 and US$2,000 each according to their rank and affiliation. As of February 2007, 40,068 ex-combatants 
(including 346 females) had received reintegration support. In addition, all former professional soldiers (ex-
RPA, ex-FAR and ex-RDF) receive a Recognition of Services Allowance, which ranges from $300 for privates 
to $1,000 for colonels. This allowance is paid in two instalments: a first instalment of US$100 is paid one 
month after the former soldier settles in a community or registers with the RDRC, and the balance is paid two 
months after this. In addition, the most vulnerable ex-combatants are eligible for a one-time Vulnerability 
Support Window grant of approximately US$333. Recipients for this grant are publicly selected by local-level 
committees comprised of excombatant representatives, administrative officials and the RDRC. The RDRC has 
also encouraged ex-combatants to form associations and micro-credit projects to improve their economic 
opportunities (Takeuchi, 2011). There were also breakthroughs in respect of demilitarisation of child soldiers. 
As pointed out by Takeuchi (2011) child soldiers from different groups have been demobilised and 
reintegrated in three distinct phases:  
i. RPF Child soldiers from 1994 through 1998 
ii. Child soldiers who accompanied the ALIR I incursion into Rwanda; and 
iii. Child soldiers with armed combatants in Congo. 
 
The child soldiers were made to pass through three month rehabilitation at designated canters after which 
they were reunited to their families. After joining their families, some of the child-soldiers benefitted from the 
state facilitated health-care, vocational training and some form of vulnerability-based education support. 
 
5. Peculiarities and Legacies of the Rwandan Model of DDR 
The Rwandan model of DDR essentially fits into the conventional mode of DDR in the contemporary 
world. Operationally, however, it has a number of contextual peculiarities that make it stand out. First, it 
technically excluded the disarmament component of the DDR process (Takeuchi, 2011). In other words, there 
was no concrete scheme or programme by which it sought to disarm the ex-combatants and/or military 
dissidents. Secondly, DDR in Rwanda was highly military centred. To be sure, the first phase (1997-2001) led 
to the demobilisation of 18,692 RPA soldiers and the re-integration of around 15,000 ex-FAR soldiers into the 
regular national force (Waldorf, 2009). Although, the second phase (2001-2008) vigorously sought to include 
the various ex-armed groups, it nonetheless faired rather badly in making significant impact in that regard 
(Takeuchi, 2011). Thirdly, the Gracaca system of transitional justice provided the enabling environment for 
the success of DDR in Rwanda, particularly in the second phase. One of the important indicators of the success 
of DDR in Rwanda was the downsizing 80,000 in 2002 to 35,000 in 2008 (Takeuchi, 2011). Thus reduction of 
the military size by half not only helped in stabilizing and professionalizing the Armed Forces, but also helped 
in forestalling dissidence within the sector. Fiscally, it reduced the hitherto huge budgetary allocations on 
military (Waldorf, 2009) enabling their reinvestment on other competitive sectors of the national economy. 
Furthermore, the Rwandan DDR was inclusive and sensitive to human security. In addition to the cash 
allowance given to participant at the time of demobilization and reintegration a grant called „vulnerability 
support window‟ was instituted for ex-combatants. There were also assistance packages dedicated to former 
child soldiers, female ex-combatant, disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants, as well as dependants of the 
ex-armed groups (Takeuchi, 2011). On the whole, the Rwandan example of DDR can be said to be fairly 
successful. This is in spite of the perceptible threat of criminal prosecution of ex-combatants who have 
identified with the process as well as the continued violence orchestrated by recalcitrant armed groups in some 
parts of the country. As (Waldorf, 2009) puts it: 
Post-genocide Rwanda provides a remarkable counter-example, where DDR has largely succeeded despite 
the ongoing threat of criminal prosecutions. Most of the ex-combatants who fought on the side of the 
genocidal forces have been demobilised and reintegrated over the last twelve years. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
DDR is a veritable aspect of the contemporary security sector reform (SSR) in conflict torn countries. It 
also fits into the agenda of state/peace-building in the post-conflict states. Over the years a variety of DDR 
has been implemented in different parts of the world, with African states taking a lion‟s share. The Rwandan 
model of DDR, implemented between 1997 and 2008, represents an instance of a successful DDR programme 
in Africa. The greatest legacy of the Rwandan DDR was its success in bringing about effective demobilisation 
and reintegration of many ex-combatants within the domain of formal military sector. Its success in the area of 
ensuring disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the ex-armed groups was vitiated by the dialectics 
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of domestic and regional security in the Great Lakes region. In the light of the limited success of the Rwandan 
DDR efforts, it is therefore recommended that future DDR programmes in Africa should be holistic and 
pragmatic enough to address the concerns of DDR within the formal military sector as well as frontiers of 
militia formations. This entails considering DDR not merely as a SSR, but essentially, an effort at state 
building in conflict and post-conflict situations. 
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Appendix-1:  
 
Table-6. The Context of DDR Programmes in 1989-2010: Conflict status, the way in which the conflict ended, the presence of an 
international peace mission, and whether DDR was followed by lasting peace. 
 Start of 
DDR 
End of 
DDR 
Status of 
conflict when 
DDR started 
Way in which 
conflict ended 
International 
peace mission? 
DDR followed 
by lasting 
peace? 
Afghanistan 2003 2005 Ongoing …. Yes No 
Angola 1994 1996 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Angola 2002 2009 Ongoing Low activity Yes No  
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 2007 Terminated Peace agreement Yes No 
Burundi 2004 2008 Ongoing Peace agreement Yes No 
Cambodia 1992 1993 Ongoing Victory Yes Yes 
Central African Republic 2004 2007 Terminated Victory Yes No 
Chad 2005 2010 Ongoing Low activity Yes No 
Colombia 2003 2006 Ongoing … No Yes 
Congo-Brazzaville 2008 2009 Terminated Ceasefire No Yes 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2004 2012 Ongoing Peace agreement Yes No 
El Salvador  1992 1993 Terminated Peace agreement Yes No 
Eritrea-Ethiopia I 1993 1997 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Eritrea-Ethiopia II 2002 2008 Terminated Peace agreement Yes No 
Ethiopia-Eritrea I 1991 1994 Terminated Victory No Yes 
Ethiopia-Eritrea II 2000 2007 Terminated Peace agreement Yes Yes 
Guatemala 1996 1998 Terminated Peace agreement Yes Yes 
Guinea Bissau 2001 2005 Terminated Victory No Yes 
Haiti 1994 1996 Terminated Victory Yes No 
Indonesia (East Timor) 1999 2001 Terminated Peace agreement Yes Yes 
Indonesia (Aceh) 2005 2009 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Ivory Coast 2005 2008 Terminated Peace agreement Yes Yes 
Liberia 2003 2008 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Mali (Azawad) 1996 1997 Terminated Low activity No No 
Mozambique 1992 1994 Terminated Peace agreement Yes No 
Namibia 1989 1989 Terminated Peace agreement Yes Yes 
Nepal 2007 2012 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Nicaragua 1989 1992 Ongoing Ceasefire Yes Yes 
Niger (Air and Azawad) 2006 2007 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Philippines (Mindanao) 1997 2006 Ongoing …. No No 
Rwanda I 1997 2001 Terminated Peace agreement No No 
Rwanda II 2001  2008 Ongoing Low activity No No 
Serbia 1999 2001 Terminated Peace agreement No Yes 
Sierra Leone 1998 2004 Ongoing Peace agreement Yes Yes 
Somalia 2003 2007 Terminated … No No 
Sudan 2005 2012 Ongoing … Yes No 
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Tajikistan 1999 2003 Terminated Victory Yes Yes 
Uganda I 1992 1995 Ongoing Low activity Yes No 
Uganda II 2000 2008 Ongoing Low activity No No 
UK (Northern Ireland) 1998 2005 Terminated Ceasefire No Yes 
Total   26 
(terminated)/14 
(ongoing) 
 23  
Source: Adapted from Banholzer (2004). When do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes succeed? Bonn: Germany 
Development Institute. 
 
Appendix-2. Abbreviations. 
RDRC Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission 
FDLR Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda 
FAR Forces Armees Rwandaises 
AGs Armed Groups 
RDF Rwandan Defence Force 
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
UNO United Nations Organisation 
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front 
 
 
